



The Power Threat Meaning Framework: 




Advocates of a biomedical approach have argued that: it provides an evidence-based 
approach to classifying and understanding the causes of problems; adopting a biomedical 
understanding will reduce stigma; and biomedical interventions are effective and evidence-
based.  This article reviews the literature and finds not only that there is little or no evidence 
for these assumptions but that, in fact, the research evidence points to the need for the kind of 
alternative approach proposed by the PTMF.  Alternative causal models which recognise the 
role of psychosocial adversities are described and alternative approaches to diagnostic 
classification and destigmatisation programmes are suggested and innovative attempts to 
redesign services in a manner consistent with the PTMF approach are described.  The article 
concludes by discussing implications for policy-level change. 
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The PTMF was a response to the continued dominance of a reductionist biomedical approach 
to psychological distress and distressing conduct.  Advocates of this approach have argued 
that it provides an evidence-based approach to classifying and understanding the causes of 
these problems, that adopting a biomedical understanding will reduce stigma and that 
biomedical interventions are effective and evidence-based.  In this article the research 
literature on each of these aspects is reviewed and, as each are examined we will see not only 
that there is little or no evidence for these assumptions but that, in fact, the evidence points to 
the need for the kind of alternative approach proposed by the PTMF.  The article describes 
alternative causal models which recognise the role of psychosocial adversities, alternative 
approaches to diagnostic classification and destigmatisation programmes and innovative 
attempts to redesign services in a manner consistent with the PTMF approach.  It concludes 
by discussing implications for policy-level change. 
 
 
How a biomedical approach obscures the causal role of psychosocial adversities 
 
A reductionist biomedical understanding of the causes of psychological distress and 
distressing behaviour is dominant in mainstream psychiatry (Bentall, 2003, 2009; Read & 
Dillon, 2013) Yet, despite decades of optimistic claims that simple biological causes will be 
found for a range of diagnostic categories, researchers are still no nearer to their goal.  For 
example, a review aiming to find evidence of a genetic basis for depression found, instead, ‘a 
strong association between the number of stressful life events and risk of depression across 
the studies’ (Risch et al., 2009, p. 2462).  A similar pattern is seen in relation to the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia (Bentall, 2003; Read & Dillon, 2013)  This is biological psychiatry’s 
flagship construct, with, supposedly, a strong bio-genetic etiology and one where the 
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hypothesis that childhood adversities played a causal role has previously been seen as quite 
controversial. A 2012 meta-analysis, however, looked at six types of childhood adversity: 
sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse, neglect, bullying and parental death. The 
reviewers located18 case-control studies (n = 3,904), 10 prospective or quasi-prospective 
studies (n = 41,803) and eight population-based cross-sectional studies (n = 35,546). The 
review found that there were significant associations between childhood adversity and 
psychosis across all three research designs, with an overall effect of OR = 2.78 (95% CI, 
2.34-3.31). It concluded that ‘[t]hese findings indicate that childhood adversity is strongly 
associated with increased risk for psychosis.’ (Varese et al., 2012, p. 661). The failure to find 
a biological cause and the evidence for psychosocial causes has led at least one prominent 
schizophrenia researcher to rethink their assumptions.   Recently, British psychiatrist Robin 
Murray admitted: 
In the last two decades, it has become obvious that child abuse, urbanization, 
migration, and adverse life events contribute to the etiology of schizophrenia and 
other psychoses. This has been a big shift for me! My preconceptions had made me 
blind to the influence of the social environment.  
Murray (2016. p. 255).  
 
 
Two recent reviews have summarised evidence that psychosocial factors play a causal role in 
the kinds of problems attracting diagnoses of psychosis (Cooke, 2017; Read, 2013a).  A 
number of studies and reviews have identified some of the specific adversities that have been 
proven to have a causal role, usually in combination, in most sorts of distress and despair in 
adulthood, including psychosis (Bentall, 2009; Johnstone & Boyle, 2018, pp. 92-151; Kessler 
et al., 2010; Read, 2020; Read, 2013a; Read, Morrison, & Waddingham, 2020; Varese et al., 
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2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).  They include factors occurring during pregnancy (e.g. 
maternal prenatal health and stress); during childhood (neglect, sexual, physical and 
emotional abuse, witnessing violence as a child and early parental loss) and factors occurring 
across the lifespan:  bullying; heavy early cannabis use; rape and physical assault; war 
trauma; absolute and relative poverty; ethnicity (mediated by poverty, isolation and racism); 
discrimination (racism, sexism, homophobia, etc.); and urban living. 
 
Child abuse plays a causal role in most mental health problems, including: depression, 
anxiety, eating difficulties, sexual problems, ‘personality disorders’, dissociation, substance 
abuse, PTSD, mood swings and psychosis (Kessler et al. 2010; Read 2013a; Varese et al. 
2012). Adults who were abused when they were children are higher users of adult mental 
health services; have earlier, longer and more frequent psychiatric hospital admissions; have 
higher global symptom severity; and are more likely to self-harm and kill themselves 
(Hepworth & McGowan 2013; Read 2013a). Adults scoring high on the Adverse Childhood 
Experiences scale are 10 times more likely to be prescribed antipsychotics and 17 times more 
likely to be prescribed antidepressants (Anda et al, 2007).  
 
This is not to say that biological processes do not play a role but they are not the primary 
cause of distress in the way that a biological reductionist model assumes.  Rather, as the 
PTMF notes, biology is a ‘mediator and enabler of all human experience’ (p. 7), something 
we discuss at length in our 30-page chapter on ‘The role of biology’.  Indeed, our biology is 
affected by what has happened to us -- biological differences can be caused by the social 
environment.  For example, biological researchers have argued that differences between the 
brains of people diagnosed with ‘schizophrenia’ and the brains of ‘normal’ people, show that 
‘schizophrenia’ is a ‘brain disease’.  Many such claims of biological differences and causes 
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have been wildly exaggerated or are completely unsubstantiated. But they also make a simple 
mistake – to assume that biological differences are simplistically caused by biology.  
However, the same brain differences have been found in abused young children, providing 
evidence for a Traumagenic Neurodevelopmental model of psychosis (Read, Fosse, 
Moskowitz & Perry, 2014). 
 
Chapter 4 of the PTMF devotes sixty pages to reviewing the literature on the role of the 
social context (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018, pp. 92-151), focussing primarily on childhood 
adversity, gender, ‘race’ and ethnicity and social class and poverty.  It is argued that 
researchers have often neglected the role that power plays in how adversities impact on 
people.  Six different kinds of power are described: coercive; legal; economic and material; 
biological/embodied; interpersonal; and ideological (see Mary Boyle’s article on power, this 
issue) 
 
This last form of power -- ideological power -- refers to the way in which power works 
through language, to allow issues to be framed only in certain ways, while closing down 
other perspectives.  This is relevant to the discussion of biomedical models:  by framing 
issues only in terms of biology and by assuming biology plays the primary causal role, the 
link between adversities and distress is obscured and other ways of conceptualising distress. 
For example, the notion that since we are biological beings anything that happens to us also 
has an impact on our biology is closed down (see David Harper’s article on framing, this 
issue). 
 
Ideological power is also exerted through the way in which experiences of distress or 
distressing behaviour are diagnosed and explained by mental health professionals, thus 
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affecting the kinds of meanings available to people to understand their troubles (see John 
Cromby’s article, this issue).  Given the significant role diagnostic labelling plays in 
meaning-making, we turn to this next. 
 
 
How diagnosis appears to explain but often only obscures 
 
The use of a psychiatric diagnosis can have some advantages for some of us some of the 
time. It might make us feel that we have an explanation for our difficulties. ‘I am hearing 
voices because I have an illness called schizophrenia which is what is making me hear the 
voices’ or ‘I am feeling depressed because I am suffering from a thing called ‘depressive 
disorder’ which is making me feel depressed.’ Anxiety is caused by ‘anxiety disorder’ and so 
on. An explanation, any explanation, can be reassuring and soothing when we are confused 
and distressed. A diagnosis can also convey that the doctor knows what is going on, knows 
what is wrong with us, and, therefore, knows what to do to make us better. It might also help 
us feel less alone with our problems; other people also have the thing we’ve been told we’ve 
got. The last thing we want to hear when we tell a mental health professional, or our GP, our 
problems is ‘I’ve no idea what’s going on here; I’ve never seen anything like this before,’.  
 
In reality, however, the diagnoses tell us little or nothing about the causes of our problems. 
What they do, instead, as we explain in the PTMF, is to locate our problems firmly within us 
as an individual person, ignoring our social context, past and present. The language of 
symptoms, disorders, illnesses etc. also conveys a general sense that there is something 
wrong, medically, with us as individuals. A psychiatric diagnosis thereby tends to render our 
distressing behaviours, feelings and thought meaningless, other than as ‘symptoms’ of our 
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‘disorder’ (Bentall, 2003; Johnstone, 2014). It also focuses on deficits rather than strengths 
and, as we will see in the next section, these labels are also a major contributor to prejudice 
and stigma. A great deal of the research on social causation, biomedicalization, clinical 
iatrogenesis and stigma has been conducted by medical sociologists and readers are referred 
to Pescosolido et al (2008) and Rogers and Pilgrim (2014) for overviews of this work. 
 
A significant problem for the diagnostic approach is is that many of its categories are 
scientifically meaningless. In other words, many have inadequate reliability (the extent to 
which people can agree on who has got the thing in question) and/or validity (the degree to 
which the thing has the properties that it is supposed to have – eg a biological etiology – see 
above) (Bentall, 2003; Johnstone, 2014; Read, 2013b). Arguably the most extreme example 
of the poor science involved in psychiatric diagnoses relates to psychiatry’s flagship 
diagnosis – schizophrenia (Bentall, 2009; Read, 2013b). As early as 1968, British 
psychologist Don Bannister had concluded that ‘[s]chizophrenia as a concept, is a semantic 
Titanic, doomed before it sails, a concept so diffuse as to be unusable in a scientific context’ 
(Bannister,1968, p. 181).  Bannister went on to observe that: 
 
We diagnose one person as schizophrenic because he manifests characteristics A and 
B and diagnose a second person as schizophrenic because he manifests characteristics 
C, D and E. The two people are now firmly grouped in the same category while not 
specifically possessing any common characteristic. . . . Disjunctive categories are 
logically too primitive for scientific use. 
 




The category remains disjunctive today. There are five types of symptoms for 
‘schizophrenia’ listed in DSM-5. You only need two of them to get the diagnosis. So you and 
I can have no ‘symptoms’ in common whatsoever but we will receive the same diagnosis 
(and almost certainly the same treatment). This is scientific nonsense. 
 
In 2012, Dr Fibiger of the Psychiatry Department at the University of British Columbia, and 
ex-Vice President of Neuroscience at drug company Eli Lilly, wrote:  
 
Today, few would argue that syndromes such as schizophrenia and depression are 
single, homogeneous diseases ….  concepts such as schizophrenia will surely be 
discarded and future generations will look back and might rightfully ask “What were 
they thinking?” (Fibiger, 2012, p. 50). 
 
 
The problems of psychiatry’s diagnostic categories were recognised in a position statement 
published by the British Psychological Society’s Division of Division of Clinical Psychology 
(DCP, 2013).  This statement suggested that psychologists and others could use 
psychological formulation as an alternative to diagnosis.  The origins of the PTMF also lie in 
this document – one of its recommendations was that there should be support for ‘work, in 
conjunction with service users, on developing a multi-factorial and contextual approach, 
which incorporates social, psychological and biological factors’ (D.C.P., 2013, p.9).  In its 
final chapter, the PTMF includes a section suggesting ways in which we can avoid using 
medicalising language.  The PTMF also suggests that Provisional General Patterns may be a 
useful alternative to diagnostic categories – these attempt to describe regularities in people’s 




So far we have seen how biomedical models obscure the role of psychosocial adversities and 
how diagnostic categories are unscientific.  But advocates of the biomedical approach have 
made another claim, as noted in a recent report to the UN by one of its Special Rapporteurs, 
Dainius Pūras, a professor of child and adolescent psychiatry and public mental health in 
Lithuania: 
 
The biomedical model regards neurobiological aspects and processes as the 
explanation for mental conditions and the basis for interventions. It was believed that 
biomedical explanations, such as “chemical imbalance”, would bring mental health 
closer to physical health and general medicine, gradually eliminating stigma. 
However, that has not happened and many of the concepts supporting the biomedical 




Is Pūras right?  Has a biomedical approach failed to reduce stigma?  In the next section, we 
will review the research and find not only that it has not reduced stigma but that it may even 
have reinforced stigmatising attitudes. 
 
 
How bio-genetic causal beliefs and diagnostic labelling have exacerbated stigma 
 
Prejudice and discrimination refer to unequal treatment or exclusion from full participation in 
society because of membership of a particular group, such as people who have been labelled 
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with a psychiatric diagnosis. Stigma involves negative attitudes towards these people, which 
can be internalised in the form of shame and a sense of difference. Both are a major barrier to 
recovery (Corrigan & Kosyluk, 2013; Pyle & Morrison, 2014). Some people describe stigma 
and discrimination as more distressing than their original difficulties (Schulze & 
Angermeyer, 2003).   
 
Stigma and discrimination have been documented in relation to most mental health diagnostic 
groups, but the worst is experienced by people struggling with street drugs or alcohol and 
those diagnosed with ‘schizophrenia’. The stereotype of the ‘schizophrenic’, with the toxic 
combination of dangerousness and unpredictability at its core, is remarkably consistent over 
place and time.  The stereotype of the violent ‘madman’, still sometimes fuelled by the 
media, remains despite people diagnosed with psychosis actually being more likely to be 
assaulted than to assault others (Morgan et al. 2012). These attitudes lead to a range of forms 
of discrimination when seeking work, housing or insurance and rejection by friends and 
families are commonplace (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006; Schulze & Angermeyer, 
2003).  
 
Stigma, prejudice and discrimination are human rights issues.  As with the struggle for the 
rights of people with physical disabilities, the cause of the disability is irrelevant to the 
question of one’s civil rights.  Similarly, those who attract psychiatric diagnoses should have 
the right to access social and economic life (Read et al. 2006; Read, Haslam, & Magliano, 
2013; Sayce , 2003).  However, a body of research has consistently shown that, in relation to 
mental health, the diagnostic label one has and the public’s beliefs about the causes of 





Diagnostic labels and essentialism 
A key component of ‘medical model’ anti-stigma campaigns like ‘mental health literacy’ and 
‘mental health first aid’ is the attempt to persuade the public to adopt psychiatric diagnostic 
categories. However, taking an evidence-based approach shows that this makes things worse 
not better. In correlational and experimental studies alike (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2005; 
Read et al., 2006, Read, Haslam, & Magliano, 2013; Magliano et al., 2017), labelling 
someone with a diagnosis is associated with fear, rejection, desire for social distance, 
pessimism about their chances of recovery and a range of negative perceptions (dangerous, 
unpredictable, dependent, lacking responsibility for their actions, lacking humanity and 




Anti-stigma campaigns, such as the current UK ‘Time to Change’ (www.time-to-
change.org.uk) and the National Association on Mental Illness’s ‘CureStigma’ 
(https://www.nami.org/stigmafree) usually focus on stigma rather than discrimination, and 
adopt the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ strategy. This attempts to educate the 
public to think in terms of biologically based, medical illnesses, a message sometimes 
reinforced by high-profile celebrities. The thinking behind this well-intentioned strategy is 
that if we can’t control our behavior, we can’t be held responsible and, therefore, can’t be 
blamed. It is the ‘mad not bad’ argument, with the mad component portrayed as biologically 
based illnesses.  Of course, this ignores the fact that many people are discriminated against on 
the basis of things over which they have no control – ethnicity, gender, disability and so on 




However, this approach has consistently been shown to increase, rather than decrease, 
prejudice, fear and pessimism about recovery (Angermeyer, Holzinger, & Schomerus, 2011; 
Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013; Magliano, Citarelli, & Read, 2020; Read et al., 2006; 
Read et al., 2013) both in the UK and worldwide. Our 2013 review of the relationship 
between attitudes and causal beliefs about ‘schizophrenia’ ‘psychosis’ or ‘mental illness’ in 
16 countries found that bio-genetic causal beliefs were strongly related to negative attitudes 
while the opposite holds for psycho-social beliefs, like believing that people become 
distressed as an understandable response to trauma and other adversities in their life (Read, 
Haslam, & Magliano, 2013). A meta-analysis of this same body of research concurs that 
‘medicalisation’ of human distress via ‘biogenetic explanations’ increases pessimism about 
recovery and perceived dangerousness (Kvaale et al., 2013). 
 
In a recent study, 343 US mental health clinicians read vignettes describing patients with four 
‘disorders’ and were given biogenetic or psychosocial explanations. For example, for ‘social 
phobia’ the psychosocial explanations included bullying, neglectful parents, and failure to 
learn to trust others whilst the biological explanations included low serotonin levels, an 
abnormally active amygdala and a hereditary component. The biological explanation led to 
significantly lower feelings of empathy towards the person, across all four conditions 
(Lebowitz & Ahn, 2014). 
 
Professor Nick Haslam has suggested that psychological essentialism may help to understand 
why it is that bio-genetic causal beliefs and associated diagnostic labelling lead to fear and 
prejudice. He notes that some types of category imply a shared, unobservable essence 
beneath their superficial properties. Essentialism involves several ideas: immutability (i.e., 
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category membership is fixed); naturalness (i.e., the category is part of nature); objective (i.e., 
the category is not a human construction, it is ‘real’); discreteness (i.e., either/or category 
membership); uniformity (i.e., all members are essentially the same); and informative (i.e., 
knowing someone belongs to the category tells us a lot about them). 
When the immutable, natural, categorical characteristics involve dangerousness and the idea 
there is something wrong with people’s brains, it is not hard to see how the medical model 
leads to fear and discrimination and to pessimism about recovery. (Haslam & Whelan, 2008; 
Kvaale et al., 2013). 
 
Given the research findings summarised above, it is of concern that, for more than 70 years, 
biological psychiatrists have been trying to persuade us all to adopt a biomedical approach.  
For example, in 1961, the US Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (JCMIH) 
concluded: 
 
The principle of sameness as applied to the mentally sick versus the physically sick 
has become a cardinal tenet of mental health education … Psychiatry has tried  
diligently to make society see the mentally ill  in its way and has railed at the public’s 
antipathy or indifference. (JCMIH 1961, p. 59) 
 
 
Fortunately in 24 of 25 countries where surveys have been conducted the public still believes 
that mental health problems, including ‘schizophrenia’, are caused more by social factors like 
poverty, stress and violence than by biogenetic factors (Read et al., 2006; Read, Magliano, & 
Beavan, 2013).  Thus the approach of the PTMF is very much consistent with public views in 
many countries.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the JCMIH findings, the exception is the 
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USA, which has arguably the most rigidly bio-genetic approach to mental health in the world 
and where drug companies can advertise direct to consumers – for example on TV -- 
promoting the idea that all forms of human distress are illnesses in need of their products.  
Everywhere else the public has the same view:  that bad things happen and they can mess us 
up. And we continue to believe this despite millions of dollars, often drug company money, 
being spent, for decades, trying to get us to change our minds. 
 
Alternatives 
An evidence-based approach to destigmatisation dictates that the ‘mental illness is an illness 
like any other approach’ be abandoned. We have seen that there is evidence that psycho-
social explanations are associated with positive attitudes. It is not clear why social causal  
beliefs improve attitudes.  It has been argued that the ‘social’ is more important than the 
‘causal’ in that it seems any normal information about a person increases ‘ascribed humanity’ 
(Martinez, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, & Hinshaw, 2011). Indeed, the strongest predictor of low 
fear and discrimination is the amount of contact with the people who are the object of the 
discrimination (Angermeyer & Dietrich 2006; Read &  Harre, 2001; Read, Haslam, & 
Magliano, 2013). This is a long-established finding in social psychology. Imagined 
differences between people can lead to fear which leads to a desire for social distance from 
the other which leads to continued ignorance and so on.  It is unfortunate, therefore, that one 
goal of the illness model approach, that of increasing confidence in  medical  professionals 
and ‘treatments’,  seems to reduce confidence in our own abilities to help one another 
(Riedel-Heller, Matschinger, & Angermeyer,  2005), thereby inhibiting exactly the sort of 





So how might we design programmes that will reduce stigma and discrimination?  A number 
of studies (Corrigan & Kosyluk, 2013; Sayce, 2003; Read et al., 2006; Read, Haslam, & 
Magliano, 2013) suggest that effective community-based efforts tend to be based on a 
number of key principles.  Firstly, those who are discriminated against are fully involved in 
the design and management of the programme.  Secondly, they should provide opportunities 
for increased contact, but in a context where differences between people are acknowledged 
and valued and where the participation of and contribution by people with mental health 
problems is positively promoted.  Thirdly, stereotypes about violence need to be addressed 
(including campaigns to change negative media coverage).  Fourthly, the power differentials 
that underpin discrimination need to be addressed and so campaigns should include, in their 
materials,  a range of different groups (e.g. varying by gender, age, ethnicity, etc.).  Lastly, 
educational campaigns are not enough on their own and need to be combined with legislation 
to outlaw discrimination on the basis of mental health. 
 
 
So far we have seen that a biomedical approach to distress and distressing behaviour is not 
consistent with the research literature on psychosocial causes, that its categories are deeply 
problematic and that its anti-stigma campaigns are counter-productive.  We turn now to 








The inadequacy of biomedical approaches and the need to transform and re-design 
mental health services 
 
A biomedical approach is dominant in the mental health services of many countries and yet a 
number of studies have demonstrated the inadequacy and dangers of psychiatric drugs 
(Bentall, 2009; Davies & Read, 2019; Hutton et al., 2013; Kirsch, 2009; Moncrieff, 2008;  
Read & Williams, 2019) and ECT  (Read & Bentall, 2010; Read, Kirsch, & McGrath, 2020).  
This inadequacy has also been recognised by the UN Special Rapporteur, Dainius Pūras who 
has concluded that ‘[r]eductive biomedical approaches to treatment that do not adequately 
address contexts and relationships can no longer be considered compliant with the right to 
health’ (2017, p.17). 
 
The use of these interventions is enabled, as we discuss in the PTMF, by the use of diagnoses 
which give the appearance that psychiatric interventions are like those in the rest of medicine.  
This is not to say that drugs may not occasionally be helpful in certain contexts.  Critical 
psychiatrist Joanna Moncrieff (2008), for example, has argued that the current approach to 
psychiatric medication adopts a ‘disease-based’ model where drugs are described as 
‘treatments’ claiming to address presumed, but empirically discredited, biological causes.  
She argues, instead, that we could adopt a ‘drug-based’ approach which acknowledges that 
drugs have a range of positive and negative effects (in the absence of any chemical imbalance 
that needs correcting) and so could be used carefully and pragmatically, for relatively brief 





What is the experience of people using mental health services given what we know of the 
causal role of psychosocial factors?  Some long-term users of New Zealand mental health 
services gave the following responses: 
 
There were so many doctors and registrars and nurses and social workers and 
psychiatric district nurses in your life asking you about the same thing, mental, 
mental, mental, but not asking you why. 
 
I think there was an assumption that I had a mental illness and, you know, because I 
wasn’t saying anything about the abuse I’d suffered no one knew. 
 
I just wish they would have said “What happened to you? What happened?” But they 
didn’t.  (Lothian & Read, 2002, p. 101). 
 
 
Here again, we see that a biomedical approach obscures the role of adversities.  Often people 
who have suffered significant adversities in their life are re-traumatised when they have 
contact with mental health services since they are not asked about the reasons why they may 
have become distressed.  If they had been asked about these then they might have understood 
that, rather than being symptoms of a purported disorder, their experiences of distress were 
intelligible responses to previous adversities, as we argue in the PTMF. 
 
In some recent work I and my colleagues have reviewed a range of studies and found, 
unfortunately, that this is a common experience for many of those seeking help.  In one 
review we focused on whether adult mental health services identified child abuse and neglect 
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and found that most cases were not identified (Read, Harper, Tucker, & Kennedy, 2018b). In 
another we examined research on how mental health services responded when child abuse or 
neglect became known and found that rates of referral to appropriate therapy ranged from 8% 
to 23% (Read et al., 2018a).  Rates of both identification and adequate response were 
particularly low for neglect, and for men and people experiencing psychosis. Less than 2% of 
all cases were referred to legal authorities. 
 
If services were to change so that they responded more humanely and effectively to child 
maltreatment, what kinds of barriers would need to be overcome?  Our research (Read et al., 
2018a, p. 1615) suggests that mental health professionals’ beliefs are one obstacle.  For 
example, holding strong bio-genetic causal beliefs, believing that talking about child abuse is 
irrelevant for people with psychosis diagnoses, or believing that disclosures by psychiatric 
service users are often false, imagined or delusional are major impediments.  Similarly, many 
professionals fear that talking about it will distress people and make their problems worse, or 
they may believe that there are more immediate concerns to deal with.  What is also clear is 
that many professionals lack knowledge about the prevalence and effects of child 
maltreatment, and lack confidence in how to ask about and respond to childhood adversities.  
This indicates the need for a large-scale programme of training for mental health 
professionals. 
 
The PTMF would be a useful resource for such a training initiative.  It suggests that we 
replace the question at the heart of biomedical approaches -- ‘what is wrong with you?’ -- 
with four others: 
 
‘What has happened to you?’ (How has power operated in your life?) 
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‘How did it affect you?’ (What kind of threats does this pose?) 
‘What sense did you make of it?’ (What is the meaning of these situations and 
experiences to you?) 
‘What did you have to do to survive?’ (What kinds of threat Response are you using?) 
 
Johnstone and Boyle (2018, p.9) 
 
 
But for such an approach to become fully embedded in mental health services there needs to 
be systemic organisational change.  Some ideas for how we might go about this come from 
organisations that have attempted to transform their services using the principles of ‘Trauma-
Informed Care’.  These principles are very much consistent with the PTMF conceptual 
framework though we suggest that it may be more helpful to include a broader range of 
adversities since the term ‘trauma’ can imply a discrete event and many service users may not 




The example of trauma-informed services 
Services based on the principles of trauma-informed care may include specific types of 
therapies for individuals who have experienced trauma but the focus is on the culture of the 
service as a whole. The US National Centre for Trauma-Informed Care established by 
SAMHSA (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) notes that, when 
services adopt these principles ‘its entire organization, management, and service delivery 
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system is assessed and potentially modified to include a basic understanding of how trauma 
affects the life of an individual seeking services.’ (SAMHSA, 2015). 
 
The Australian Blue Knot Foundation (www.blueknot.org.au) has developed useful 
guidelines which are applicable to a range of services including mental and physical health, 
social care and so on (Blue Knot Foundation, 2012, p.xxviii).  Four key assumptions of a 
trauma-informed approach include, firstly, that the effects of complex (cumulative, 
underlying) trauma are pervasive, and if unresolved, negatively impact mental and physical 
health across the lifespan.  Secondly, the majority of people treated by public mental health 
and substance abuse services have trauma histories.  Thirdly, that child abuse, in all its forms, 
and chronic neglect, are the key antecedents of complex trauma, although they are not the 
only causes.  Finally, that when unresolved, complex trauma causes ongoing problems, not 
only for those who experience it, but for their children (intergenerational effects) and society 
as a whole.   
 
Thus, while it is not assumed that all service users will have experienced trauma, it is 
expected that many will have.  The idea is that all staff engage with people in such a way that 
facilitates recovery from any trauma or adversity that has led to the problems that they 
present with, that acknowledges that different traumas and adversities might require different 
responses, and that, at the very least, it avoids retraumatizing people through practices that 
either reproduce the trauma with the use of force or that dismiss the occurrence or impact of 
abuse. Whether such changes are a prerequisite for, or dependent on, a fundamental paradigm 
shift in research and services is debatable (Read, Harper, Tucker, & Kennedy, 2018a;   Read, 





Such principles remind us, once again, of the crucial role of power (Boyle, this issue).  
Psychosocial adversities arise from unequal relationships of power and, currently, many 
mental health service users are placed in similar situations when they try to access help.  
Thus, there is a need for broader service-level changes including abolishing coercive 
psychiatric interventions on the basis of diagnosis and upholding the principle of informed 
consent (especially, but not only, in relation to medication and ECT).  A key way in which 
power is exerted on people in mental health services, as we saw earlier in the discussion of 
causal theories and diagnosis, is by obscuring the meaning of their distress and its links with 
life adversities.  As a result, as we argue in the PTMF, it is important to create contexts in 
which people have agency to develop their own meanings (Cromby, this issue; Johnstone, 
this issue), developing their own personal narratives.  People can do this on their own, 
perhaps by using the Guided Discussion available on the PTMF website 
(https://www.bps.org.uk/news-and-policy/introducing-power-threat-meaning-framework) and 
they can also do this in psychological therapy, using psychological formulations rather than 
diagnoses.  However, this can also be done collectively with others and a number of peer-led 
groups of service users have found the PTMF a helpful way of structuring discussions about 
the links between adversity and distress (SHIFT, this issue).  Indeed, given the importance of 
addressing inequalities of power, services run by experts-by-experience have a crucial role to 
play, such as those inspired by the Hearing Voices Network (Longden, Read & Dillon, 2018). 
 
 




Change at the level of services is necessary but not sufficient.  There is also a need for 
societal change in how we think about psychological distress and troubling conduct.  UN 
Special Rapporteur, Dainius Pūras (2017, p.16), has argued that we need to move beyond 
‘individualized responses towards action on a range of structural barriers and inequalities’ 
(p.16).  Instead, he identifies an ‘urgent need for a shift in approach’ which ‘should prioritize 
policy innovation at the population level, targeting social determinants and abandon the 
predominant medical model that seeks to cure individuals by targeting “disorders”’ (Pūras, 
2017, p.19).  Pūras suggests that we need to develop public policies which ‘promote non-
violent and respectful relationships in families, schools, workplaces, communities and health 
and social services’ (2017, p.16).  In the final chapter of the PTMF, ‘Ways forward’, we 
make a number of suggestions for changes which could be made at the level of national 
policy in terms of public health and mental health policy; the legal system; research and 
research-funding; and access to social care, housing and welfare benefits.  We recognise that 
this will require the kind of concerted long-term action which can only be sustained by new 
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